Abstract: Over two decades ago a "quite revolution" overwhelmingly replaced knowledgebased approaches in natural language processing (NLP) by quantitative (e.g., statistical, corpus-based, machine learning) methods. Although it is our firm belief that purely quantitative approaches cannot be the only paradigm for NLP, dissatisfaction with purely engineering approaches to the construction of large knowledge bases for NLP are somewhat justified. In this paper we hope to demonstrate that both trends are partly misguided and that the time has come to enrich logical semantics with an ontological structure that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about in ordinary language. In this paper it will be demonstrated that assuming such an ontological structure a number of challenges in the semantics of natural language (e.g., metonymy, intensionality, copredication, nominal compounds, etc.) can be properly and uniformly addressed.
INTRODUCTION
Over two decades ago a "quite revolution", as Charniak (1995) once called it, overwhelmingly replaced knowledgebased approaches in natural language processing (NLP) by quantitative (e.g., statistical, corpus-based, machine learning) methods. In recent years, however, the terms ontology, semantic web and semantic computing have been in vogue, and regardless of how these terms are being used (or misused) we believe that this 'semantic counter revolution' is a positive trend since corpus-based approaches to NLP, while useful in some language processing tasks -see (Ng and Zelle, 1997 ) for a good review -cannot account for compositionality and productivity in natural language, not to mention the complex inferential patterns that occur in ordinary language use. The inferences we have in mind here can be illustrated by the following example:
(1) Pass that car will you. a. He is really annoying me. b. They are really annoying me.
Clearly, speakers of ordinary language can easily infer that 'he' in (1a) refers to the person driving [that] car, while 'they' in (1b) is a reference to the people riding [that] car. Such inferences, we believe, cannot theoretically be learned (how many such examples will be needed?), and are thus beyond the capabilities of any quantitative approach. On the other hand, and although it is our firm belief that purely quantitative approaches cannot be the only paradigm for NLP, dissatisfaction with purely engineering approaches to the construction of large knowledge bases for NLP (e.g., Lenat and Ghua, 1990 ) are somewhat justified. While language 'understanding' is for the most part a commonsense 'reasoning' process at the pragmatic level, as example (1) illustrates, the knowledge structures that an NLP system must utilize should have sound linguistic and ontological underpinnings and must be formalized if we ever hope to build scalable systems (or as John McCarthy once said, if we ever hope to build systems that we can actually understand!). Thus, and as we have argued elsewhere (Saba, 2007) , we believe that both trends are partly misguided and that the time has come to enrich logical semantics with an ontological structure that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about in ordinary language. Specifically, we argue that very little progress within logical semantics have been made in the past several years due to the fact that these systems are, for the most part, mere symbol manipulation systems that are devoid of any content. In particular, in such systems where there is hardly any link between semantics and our commonsense view of the world, it is quite difficult to envision how one can "uncover" the considerable amount of content that is clearly implicit, but almost never explicitly stated in our everyday discourse. For example, consider the following: Although they tend to use the least number of words to convey a particular thought (perhaps for computational effectiveness, as Givon (1984) once suggested), speakers of ordinary language clearly understand the sentences in (2) as follows: Clearly, any compositional semantics must somehow account for this [missing text] , as such sentences are quite common and are not at all exotic, farfetched, or contrived. Linguists and semanticists have usually dealt with such sentences by investigating various phenomena such as metaphor (3a); metonymy (3b); textual entailment (3c); nominal compounds (3d); lexical ambiguity (3e), co-predication (3f); and quantifier scope ambiguity (3g), to name a few. However, and although they seem to have a common denominator, it is somewhat surprising that in looking at the literature one finds that these phenomena have been studied quite independently; to the point where there is very little, if any, that seems to be common between the various proposals that are often suggested. In our opinion this state of affairs is very problematic, as the prospect of a distinct paradigm for every single phenomenon in natural language cannot be realistically contemplated. Moreover, and as we hope to demonstrate in this paper, we believe that there is indeed a common symptom underlying these (and other) challenging problems in the semantics of natural language. Before we make our case, let us at this very early juncture suggest this informal explanation for the missing text in (2): SOLID is (one of) the most salient features of a Rock (2a); people, and not a sandwich, have 'wants' and EAT is the most salient relation that holds between a Human and a Sandwich (2b) 1 ; Human is the type of object of which AR-TICULATE is the most salient property (2c); made-of is the most salient relation between an Artifact (and consequently a House) and a substance (Brick) (2d); PLAY is the most salient relation that holds between a Human and a Game, and not some structure (and, bridge is a game); and, finally, in the (possible) world that we live in, a House cannot be located on more than one Street. The point of this informal explanation is to suggest that the problem underlying most challenges in the semantics of natural language seems to lie in semantic formalisms that employ logics that are mere abstract symbol manipulation systems; systems that are devoid of any ontological content. What we suggest, instead, is a compositional semantics that is grounded in commonsense metaphysics, a semantics that views "logic as a language"; that is, a logic that has content, and ontological content, in particular, as has been recently and quite convincingly advocated by Cocchiarella (2001) .
In the rest of the paper we will first propose a semantics that is grounded in a strongly-typed ontology that reflects our commonsense view of reality and the way we talk about it in ordinary language; subsequently, we will formalize the notion of 'salient property' and 'salient relation' and suggest how a strongly-typed compositional system can possibly utilize such information to explain some complex phenomena in natural language.
A TYPE SYSTEM FOR ORDINARY LANGUAGE
The utility of enriching the ontology of logic by introducing variables and quantification is well-known. For example, q r p ) ( ∧ ⊃ is not even a valid statement in propositional logic, when p = all humans are mortal, q = Socrates is a human and r = Socrates is mortal. In first-order logic, however, this inference is easily produced, by exploiting one important aspect of variables, namely, their scope. However, and as will shortly be demonstrated, copredication, metonymy and various other problems that are relegated to intensionality in natural language are due the fact that another important aspect of a variable, namely its type, has not been exploited. In particular, much like scope connects various predicates within a formula, when a variable has more than one type in a single scope, type unification is the process by which one can discover implicit relationships that are not explicitly stated, but are in fact implicit in the type hierarchy. To begin with, therefore, we shall first introduce a type system that is assumed in the rest of the paper.
The Tree of Language
In Types and Ontology Fred Sommers (1963) suggested several years ago that there is a strongly typed ontology that seems to be implicit in all that we say in ordinary spoken language, where two objects x and y are considered to be of the same type iff the set of monadic predicates that are significantly (that is, truly or falsely but not absurdly) predicable of x is equivalent to the set of predicates that are significantly predicable of y. Thus, while they make a references to four distinct classes (sets of objects), for an ontologist interested in the relationship between ontology and natural language, the noun phrases in (4) are ultimately referring to two types only, namely Cat and Number:
prime number
In other words, whether we make a reference to an old cat or to a black cat, in both instances we are ultimately speaking of objects that are of the same type; and this, according to Sommers, is a reflection of the fact that the set of monadic predicates in our natural language that are significantly predicable of old cats is exactly the same set that is significantly predicable of black cats. Let us say sp(t,s) is true if s is the set of predicates that are significantly predicable of some type t, and let T represent the set of all types in our ontology, then
That is, to be a type (in the ontology) is to have a non-empty set of predicates that are significantly predicable (5a) 2 ; and a type s is a subtype of t iff the set of predicates that are significantly predicable of s is a subset of the set of predicates that are significantly predicable of t (5b); consequently, the identity of a concept (and thus concept similarity) is well-defined as given by (5c). Note here that according to (5a), abstract objects such as events, states, properties, activities, processes, etc. are also part of our ontology since the set of predicates that is significantly predicable of any such object is not empty. For example, one can always speak of an imminent event, or an event that was cancelled, etc., that is sp etc.
. In addition to events, abstract objects such as states and processes, etc. can also be predicated; for example, one can always say idle of a some state, and one always speak of starting and terminating a process, etc.
In our representation, therefore, concepts belong to two quite distinct categories: (i) ontological concepts, such as Animal, Substance, Entity, Artefact, Event, State, etc., which are assumed to exist in a subsumption hierarchy, and where the fact that an object of type Human is (ultimately) an object of type Entity is expressed as Human Entity ; and (ii) logical concepts, which are the properties (that can be said) of and the relations (that can hold) between ontological concepts. To illustrate the difference (and the relation) between the two, consider the following: In addition to logical and ontological concepts, there are also proper nouns, which are the names of objects; objects that could be of any type. A proper noun, such as sheba, is interpreted as , ) is true of some individual object x (which could be any Thing), and s if (the label) s is the name of x, and t is presumably the type of objects that P applies to (to simplify notation, however, we will often write (7) 
, ( )( ( , )) , We are using the fact that, when a is a constant and P is a predicate, Gaskin, 1995) .
TEACHER is a mere property that we have come to use to talk of objects of type Human 4 . In other words, while the property of being a TEACHER that x may exhibit is accidental (as well as temporal, cultural-dependent, etc.), the fact that some x is an object of type Human (and thus an Animal, etc.) is not. Moreover, a logical concept such as TEACHER is assumed to be defined by virtue of some logical expression such as ( ::
where the exact nature of ϕ might very well be susceptible to temporal, cultural, and other contextual factors, depending on what, at a certain point in time, a certain community considers a TEACHER to be. Specifically, the logical concept TEACHER must be defined by some expression such as
That is, any x, which must be an object of type Human, is a TEACHER iff x is the agent of some Activity a, where a is a TEACHING activity. It is certainly not for convenience, elegance or mere ontological indulgence that a logical concept such as TEACHER must be defined in terms of more basic ontological categories (such as an Activity) as can be illustrated by the following example:
(12) sheba is a superb teacher
Note that in (12), it is sheba, and not her teaching that is erroneously considered to be superb. This is problematic on two grounds: first, while SUPERB is a property that could apply to objects of type Human (such as sheba), the logical form in (12) must have a reference to an object of type Activity, as SUPERB is a property that could also be said of sheba's teaching activity. This point is more acutely made when superb is replaced by adjectives such as certified, lousy, etc., where the corresponding properties do not even apply to sheba, but are clearly modifying sheba's teaching activity (that it is CERTIFIED, or LOUSY, etc.) We shall discuss this issue in some detail below. Before we proceed, however, we need to extend the notion of type unification slightly.
More on Type Unification
It should be clear by now that our ontology, as defined thus far, assumes a Platonic universe which admits the existence of anything that can be talked about in ordinary language. Thus, and as also argued by Cocchiarella (1996) , besides abstract objects, reference in ordinary language can be made to objects that might have or could have existed, as well as to objects that might exist sometime in the future. In general, therefore, a reference to an object can be 5
• a reference to a type (in the ontology):
• a reference to an object of a certain type, an object that must have a concrete existence: X P X ( :: )( ( )) ∃ c t ; or • a reference to an object of a certain type, an object that need not actually exist:
Accordingly, and as suggested by Hobbs (1985) , the above necessitates that a distinction be made in our logical form between mere being and concrete (or actual) existence. To do this we introduce a predicate ( ) Exist x which is true when some object x has a concrete (or actual) existence, and where a reference to an object of some type is initially assumed to be imply mere being, while actual (or concrete) existence is only inferred from the context. The relationship between mere being and concrete existence can be defined as follows:
In (13a) we are simply stating that some property P is true of some object X of type t. Thus, while, ontologically, there are objects of type t that we can speak about, nothing in (13a) entails the actual (or concrete) existence of any such objects. In (13b) we are stating that the property P is true of an object X of type t, an object that must have a concrete (or actual) existence (and in particular at least the instance x); which is equivalent to saying that there is some object x which is an instance of some abstract object X, where x actually exists, and where P is true of x. Finally, (13c) states that whenever some x, which is an instance of some abstract object X of type t exists, then the property P is true of x. Thus, while (13a) makes a reference to a kind (or a type in the ontology), (13b) and (13c) make a reference to some instance of a specific type, an instance that may or may not actually exist. To simplify notation, therefore, we can write (13b) and (13c) as follows, respectively:
Exist x x
Furthermore, it should be noted that x in (13b) is assumed to have actual/concrete existence assuming that the property/relation P is actually true of x. If the truth of P(X) is just a possibility, then so is the concrete existence of some instance x of X. Formally, we have the following: 
That is, 'jon fixed a computer' is interpreted as follows: there is a unique object named jon, which is an object of type Human, and some x of type Computer (an x that actually exists) such that jon did FIX x. However, consider now the following:
Essentially, therefore, 'jon can fix a computer' is stating that whenever an object x of type Computer exists, then jon can fix x; or, equivalently, that 'jon can fix any computer'. Finally, consider the following, where it is assumed that our ontology reflects the commonsense fact that we can always speak of an Animal climbing some Physical object:
That is, 'a snake can climb a tree' is essentially interpreted as any snake (if it exists) can climb any tree (if it exists). With this background, we now proceed to tackle some interesting problems in the semantics of natural language.
SEMANTICS WITH ONTOLOGICAL CONTENT
In this section we discuss several problems in the semantic of natural language and demonstrate the utility of a semantics embedded in a strongly-typed ontology that reflects our commonsense view of reality and the way we take about it in ordinary language.
Types, Polymorphism and Nominal Modification
We first demonstrate the role type unification and polymorphism plays in nominal modification. Consider the sentence in (1) which could be uttered by someone who believes that: (i) Olga is a dancer and a beautiful person; or (ii) Olga is beautiful as a dancer (i.e., Olga is a dancer and she dances beautifully).
(17) Olga is a beautiful dancer
As suggested by Larson (1998) , there are two possible routes to explain this ambiguity: one could assume that a noun such as 'dancer' is a simple one place predicate of type , e t and 'blame' this ambiguity on the adjective; alternatively, one could assume that the adjective is a simple one place predicate and blame the ambiguity on some sort of complexity in the structure of the head noun (Larson calls these alternatives A-analysis and N-analysis, respectively).
In an A-analysis, an approach advocated by Siegel (1976), adjectives are assumed to belong to two classes, termed predicative and attributive, where predicative adjectives (e.g., red, small, etc.) are taken to be simple functions from entities to truth-values, and are thus extensional and intersective: = Adj Noun Adj Noun ∩ . Attributive adjectives (e.g., former, previous, rightful, etc.), on the other hand, are functions from common noun denotations to common noun denotations -i.e., they are predicate modifiers of type , , , e t e t , and are thus intensional and nonintersective (but subsective: Adj Noun Noun ⊆ ). On this view, the ambiguity in (17) is explained by posting two distinct lexemes ( beautiful 1 and beautiful 2 ) for the adjective beautiful, one of which is an attributive while the other is a predicative adjective. In keeping with Montague's (1970) edict that similar syntactic categories must have the same semantic type, for this proposal to work, all adjectives are initially assigned the type , , , e t e t where intersective adjectives are considered to be subtypes obtained by triggering an appropriate meaning postulate. For example, assuming the lexeme beautiful 1 is marked (for example by a lexical feature such as +INTERSECTIVE), then the meaning
∧ does yield an intersective meaning when P is beautiful 1 ; and where a phrase such as `a beautiful dancer' is interpreted as follows 6 :
While it does explain the ambiguity in (17), several reservations have been raised regarding this proposal. As Larson (1995; notes, this approach entails considerable duplication in the lexicon as this means that there are 'doublets' for all adjectives that can be ambiguous between an intersective and a non-intersective meaning. Another objection, raised by McNally and Boleda (2004) , is that in an Aanalysis there are no obvious ways of determining the context in which a certain adjective can be considered intersective. For example, they suggest that the most natural reading of (18) is the one where beautiful is describing Olga's dancing, although it does not modify any noun and is thus wrongly considered intersective by modifying Olga.
(18) Look at Olga dance. She is beautiful.
While valid in other contexts, in our opinion this observation does not necessarily hold in this specific example since the resolution of `she' must ultimately consider all entities in the discourse, including, presumably, the dancing activity that would be introduced by a Davidsonian representation of 'Look at Olga dance' (this issue is discussed further below). A more promising alternative to the A-analysis of the ambiguity in (17) has been proposed by Larson (1995 Larson ( , 1998 , who suggests that beautiful in (17) is a simple intersective adjective of type 〈e,t〉 and that the source of the ambiguity is due to a complexity in the structure of the head noun. Specifically, Larson suggests that a deverbal noun such as dancer should have the Davidsonian representation
, any x is a dancer iff x is the agent of some dancing activity (Larson's notation is slightly different). In this analysis, the ambiguity in (1) is attributed to an ambiguity in what beautiful is modifying, in that it could be said of Olga or her dancing Activity. That is, (17) is to be interpreted as follows: In fact, beautiful in (21) seems to be modifying Olga for the same reason the sentence in (22a) seems to be more natural than that in (22b).
Olga is a beautiful dancer
∃e e e olga ⇒ ∧ ( )( ( ) ( , ) dancing agent e olga ∧ ∨( ( ) ( ))
(22) a. Maria is a clever young girl. b. Maria is a young clever girl.
The sentences in (22) exemplify what is known in the literature as adjective ordering restrictions (AORs). However, despite numerous studies of AORs (e.g., see Wulff, 2003; Teodorescu, 2006) , the slightly differing AORs that have been suggested in the literature have never been formally justified.
What we hope to demonstrate below however is that the apparent ambiguity of some adjectives and adjective-ordering restrictions are both related to the nature of the ontological categories that these adjectives apply to in ordinary spoken language. Thus, and while the general assumptions in Larson's (1995; ) N-Analysis seem to be valid, it will be demonstrated here that nominal modification seem to be more involved than has been suggested thus far. In particular, it seems that attaining a proper semantics for nominal modification requires a much richer type system than currently employed in formal semantics. 
Thus, in the final analysis, 'Olga is an elderly teacher' is interpreted as follows: there is a unique object named Olga, an object that must be of type Human, and an object a of type Activity, such that a is a teaching activity, Olga is the agent of the activity, and such that elderly is true of Olga.
Adjective Ordering Restrictions
Assuming ( :: ) x Entity BEAUTIFUL -i.e., that beautiful is a property that can be said of objects of type Entity, then it is a property that can be said of a Cat, a Person, a City, a Movie, a Dance, an Island, etc. Therefore, BEAUTIFUL can be thought of as a polymorphic function that applies to objects at several levels and where the semantics of this function depend on the type of the object, as illustrated in figure 2 below 7 . Thus, and although BEAUTIFUL applies to objects of type Entity, in saying 'a beautiful car', for example, the meaning of beautiful that is accessed is that defined in the type Physical (which could in principal be inherited from a supertype). Moreover, and as is well known in the theory of programming languages, one can always perform type casting upwards, but not downwards (e.g., one can always view a Car as just an Entity, but the converse is not true) 8 . Thus, and assuming also that ( :: ) x Physical RED ; that is, assuming that RED can be said of Physical objects, then, for example, the type casting that will be required in (23a) is valid, while that in (23b) Note here that since BEAUTIFUL was preceded by YOUNG, it could have not been applicable to an abstract object of type Activity, but was instead reduced to that defined at the level of Physical, and subsequently to that defined at the type Human. A valid question that comes to mind here is how then do we express the thought 'Olga is a young dancer and she dances beautifully'. The answer is that we usually make a statement such as this: (24) Olga is a young and beautiful dancer.
Note that in this case we are essentially overriding the sequential processing of the adjectives, and thus the adjectiveordering restrictions (or, equivalently, the type-casting rules!) are no more applicable. That is, (24) is essentially equivalent to two sentences that are processed in parallel:
Olga is a yong and beautiful dancer ≡ Olga is a young dancer
Olga is a beautiful dancer ∧ Note now that 'beautiful' would again have an intersective and a subsective meaning, although 'young' will only apply to Olga due to type constraints.
Intensional Verbs and Coordination
Consider the following sentences and their corresponding translation into standard first-order logic:
can be inferred in both cases, although it is clear that 'jon sought a unicorn' should not entail the existence of a unicorn. In addressing this problem, Montague (1960) suggested treating seek as an intensional verb that more or less has the meaning of 'tries to find'; i.e. a verb of type 〈〈〈 〉 〉 〈 〉〉 e t t e t , , , , , using the tools of a higherorder intensional logic. To handle contexts where there are intensional as well as extensional verbs, mechanisms such as the 'type lifting' operation of Partee and Rooth (1983) were also introduced. The type lifting operation essentially coerces the types into the lowest type, the assumption being that if 'jon sought and found' a unicorn, then a unicorn that was initially sought, but subsequently found, must have concrete existence.
In addition to unnecessary complication of the logical form, we believe the same intuition behind the 'type lifting' operation, which, as also noted by (Kehler et. al., 1995) and Winter (2007) , fails in mixed contexts containing more than tow verbs, can be captured without the a priori separation of verbs into intensional and extensional ones, and in particular since most verbs seem to function intensionally and extensionally depending on the context. 
Physical Entity
Thus, that while painting something does not entail its existence, owning something does, and the type unification of the conjunction yields the desired result. As given by the rules concerning existence assumptions given in (13) above, the final interpretation should now be proceed as follows:
That is, 'jon painted his dog' is interpreted as follows: there is a unique object named jon, which is an object of type Human, some object d which of type Dog, such that d actually exists, jon does OWN d, and jon did PAINT d. The point of the above example was to illustrate that the notion of intensional verbs can be captured in this simple formalism without the type lifting operation, particularly since an extensional interpretation might at times be implied even if an 'intensional' verb does not coexist with an extensional verb in the same context. As an illustrative example, let us as- That is, there is a specific Human named jon that has planned a Trip, a trip that actually exists, and a trip that was LENGTHY. Finally, it should be noted here that the trip in (29) was finally considered to be an existing Event due to other information contained in the same sentence. In general, however, this information can be contained in a larger discourse. For example, in interpreting 'John planned a trip. It was lengthy' the resolution of 'it' would force a retraction of the types inferred in processing 'John planned a trip', as the information that follows will 'bring down' the aforementioned Trip from abstract to actual existence (or, from mere being to concrete existence). This discourse level analysis is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but readers interested in the computational details of such processes are referred to (van Deemter & Peters, 1996) .
Metonymy and Copredication
In addition to so-called intensional verbs, our proposal seems to also appropriately handle other situations that, on the surface, seem to be addressing a different issue. For example, consider the following:
(30) Jon read the book and then he burned it.
In Asher and Pustejovsky (2005) it is argued that this is an example of what they term copredication; which is the possibility of incompatible predicates to be applied to the same type of object. It is argued that in (30), for example, 'book' must have what is called a dot type, which is a complex structure that in a sense carries the 'informational content' sense (which is referenced when it is being read) as well as the 'physical object' sense (which is referenced when it is being burned). Elaborate machinery is then introduced to 'pick out' the right sense in the right context, and all in a well-typed compositional logic. But this approach presupposes that one can enumerate, a priori, all possible uses of the word 'book' in ordinary language 10 . Moreover, copredication seems to be a special case of metonymy, where the possible relations that could be implied are in fact much more constrained. An approach that can explain both notions, and hopefully without introducing much complexity into the logical form, should then be more desirable.
Let us first suggest the following:
(31) a. It has been argued that such sentences require an intensional treatment since a purely extensional treatment would make (54a) and (45b) erroneously entail (45c). However, we believe that the embedding of ontological types into the properties and relations yields the correct entailments without the need for complex higher-order intensional formalisms. commitments followed by some machinery that is supposed to, somehow, model meanings in terms of that stipulated structure of reality. With the gross mismatch between the trivial ontological commitments of our semantic formalisms and the reality of the world these formalisms purport to represent, it is not surprising therefore that challenges in the semantics of natural language are rampant. However, as correctly observed by Hobbs (1985) , semantics could become nearly trivial if it was grounded in an ontological structure that is "isomorphic to the way we talk about the world". The obvious question however is 'how does one arrive at this ontological structure that implicitly underlies all that we say in everyday discourse?' One plausible answer is the (seemingly circular) suggestion that the semantic analysis of natural language should itself be used to uncover this structure. In this regard we strongly agree with Dummett (1991) who states:
We must not try to resolve the metaphysical questions first, and then construct a meaningtheory in light of the answers. We should investigate how our language actually functions, and how we can construct a workable systematic description of how it functions; the answers to those questions will then determine the answers to the metaphysical ones.
What this suggests, and correctly so, in our opinion, is that in our effort to understand the complex and intimate relationship between ordinary language and everyday commonsense knowledge, one could, as also suggested in (Bateman, 1995) , "use language as a tool for uncovering the semiotic ontology of commonsense" since ordinary language is the best known theory we have of everyday knowledge. To avoid this seeming circularity (in wanting this ontological structure that would trivialize semantics; while at the same time suggesting that semantic analysis should itself be used as a guide to uncovering this ontological structure), we suggested here performing semantic analysis from the ground up, assuming a minimal (almost a trivial and basic) ontology, in the hope of building up the ontology as we go guided by the results of the semantic analysis. The advantages of this approach are: (i) the ontology thus constructed as a result of this process would not be invented, as is the case in most approaches to ontology (e.g., Lenat, & Guha (1990) ; Guarino (1995); and Sowa (1995) ), but would instead be discovered from what is in fact implicitly assumed in our use of language in everyday discourse; (ii) the semantics of several natural language phenomena should as a result become trivial, since the semantic analysis was itself the source of the underlying knowledge structures (in a sense, the semantics would have been done before we even started!)
Throughout this paper we have tried to demonstrate that a number of challenges in the semantics of natural language can be easily tackled if semantics is grounded in a stronglytyped ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about it in ordinary language. Our ultimate goal, however, is the systematic discovery of this ontological structure, and, as also argued in Saba (2007) , it is the systematic investigation of how ordinary language is used in everyday discourse that will help us discover (as opposed to invent) the ontological structure that seems to underlie all what we say in our everyday discourse.
